

1965 WAR

Special Services Group

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A History of Pakistan's Special Services Group during 1965 War

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Contents

Ranger Battalions.....	1
Operation Gibraltar.....	2
Para-Drops on Indian Airfields - 1965.....	11
Halwara.....	19

Special Services Group in 1965 War

Ranger Battalions

In July 1965, the nomenclature of the SSG was change into Rangers Wings. Thus the old 19th Baluch Regiment was reverted back to army and instead the manpower retained was divided into three wings, known as No.1 Ranger Battalion, No. 2 Ranger Battalion and a new unit was raised as No.3 Rangers Battalion. Among these three Rangers battalions, the No.3 Rangers was raised in East Pakistan and placed undercommand of 14 Infantry Division. The SSG was now modelled and organised as an independent group equivalent to an infantry brigade. Thus staff appointments like grade II

for training and operations were created and filled. A deputy commander post was also created, for administrative purposes the appointment of quartermasters and staff officers were incorporated in the table of organisation and equipment. No.1 Ranger Battalion was stationed at Cherat and No.2 Rangers Battalion at Attock. This change over was initiated in the first week of July and lasted till the end of August, the complete property and equipment had to be distributed among the two Ranger Battalions; all in all there were 348 files heads which needs to be distributed among these two. This exercise took a heavy toll on the training and planning of the upcoming operations, as considerable time was spent on this transition. Later in 1966, the nomenclature of Rangers was dropped and instead Commando Battalions was adopted which is lasting till now.

Operation Gibraltar

After the Rann Of Kutch embarrassment, Indians adopted an aggressive posture towards Pakistan, threatening to open a front of their own choice. Pakistan, morally, emotionally, politically had been supporting the freedom movement in Kashmir. Above everything else, Kashmir was and is, the pivot of Pakistan's military strategy. From early sixties {1963}, under the Mr Zulfiqar Bhutto then foreign minister, a Kashmir cell

was raised to keep the issue alive. Officers and men from SSG were deputed to establish training camps for the freedom fighters in Azad Kashmir. In line with the military thinking of that era, it was conceived and planned to raise a guerrilla force comprising of Kashmir freedom fighters, trained by own SSG , later led into Indian held Kashmir to carryout sabotage activities to an extent that the local population themselves stand up and force the Indians to abide by the united Nations resolution which calls for a plebiscite in valley. A near perfect plan, which by all accounts and rationality was deemed to be a success.

12 Infantry Division under Major General Akhtar Malik was made responsible for the operation, he presented his plan **Operation Gibraltar** to President Ayub Khan and senior army commanders, on 13th July 1965' plan was approved. The plan envisaged infiltration by small groups into Indian Held Kashmir{IHK}; area of operation was divided into four sectors. Main hypothesis revolved around the local population supporting the guerrillas, enemy committing a sizeable force to counter them thus losing moral ground among the international community. A second hypothesis was also evolved, in which, .after the favourable environments have been created then to launch a second offensive from Bhimber towards Akhnur; it was code name as **Operation Grand Slam**.

Resultantly a 5000-7000 force was raised and trained by SSG within six weeks, the Scarlet Thread of the Operation Gibraltar, revolved around two columns of forces converging from north and west at Srinagar. The force structure comprised of seven forces namely Tariq, Qasim, Khalid, Salahuddin, Ghaznvi, Babur and Nusrat . These seven forces, each had three companies which were commanded by an officer from Azad Kashmir. Major Sindhu and Captain Zaka Afridi of SSG were responsible for the establishing and training of force in signal communication. SSG provided the necessary instructors and manpower for training of this force. Camps were established at Kotli, Mong Bajri, Shinkari and Rattu. One or two officers, four non-commissioned officers and sixteen soldiers from SSG were employed at each camp for training. The primary focus of training was in handling of weapons and explosives.

Along with the Gibraltar force, SSG planned to carryout deep raids and ambushes on purely military targets inside the Indian Kashmir especially in extreme north in Kargil and Laddakh area

On 1st August 1965, the designated forces infiltrated into Indian Kashmir successfully, they carried out the task assigned to them, everything worked as per the hypothesis, less the appreciation, that local population will carry out a general uprising against the occupied Indian forces.

Hamza Company of SSG was placed undercommand 12 Division for the operations. The company trained the guerrillas, Captain Khalid Mahmood and Captain Muhammad Khan formed two training teams, later both officers and men of Hamza Company operated inside the Indian Kashmir with success Hamza Company was responsible for the conduct of Tariq and Qasim Forces. **Ghazi & Shaheen Companies.** SSG had gone into operations with an aim to recapture the three lost posts on Kafir Pahar in Kargil sector, which were lost in May 1965. Thus much before the launching of Operation Gibraltar, a force was raised exclusively comprising of SSG troops {Shaheen and Ghazi Companies} undercommand Lieutenant Colonel Afridi, it arrived in Skardu in early June 1965. Later in July Shaheen company was recalled to Cherat thus Ghazi company operated at its own. Ghazi Company divided itself into four groups, Captain Nasrallah, Captain Yamin Khokar, Captain Tariq Mahmood and Captain Tariq Rafi were the officers and leaders.

Pashkayum Bridge. Destruction of Pashkayum bridge, located 40 miles east of Kargil on 9th August 1965, was a classic commando operations led successfully by Captain Nasrallah alongwith 14 men . On 4th August , the commando party crossed over into the Indian held Kashmir. The raiding party apart from the ten commandos also had two guides and two men

from Karakorum Scouts. Trekking through an arduous and challenging mountain terrain with heavy loads, party was able to take position around the bridge by last light 11th August. A last minute unexpected event almost jeopardised the mission, three Indian trucks with troops stopped at the bridge and for an hour kept sitting in trucks, Captain Nasrallah thought probably the mission has been compromised, but the trucks departed at 2245 hours. The bridge, metal in construction had a strategic implication, its destruction would have crippled the 3rd Indian Division future movement towards the east, if not for weeks at least for days. Raiding commando party had two machine guns, one rocket launcher, one mortar and M-I rifles alongwith explosives.

At precisely 2320 hours, fire was opened upon the Indian post guarding the bridge, simultaneously, explosives were placed under the bridge and blown, within seven minutes, mission was over with no casualty; there was only one soldier who got a bullet wound on his thigh.

The extrication from such a hostile and far flung area is an exercise by itself. Team marched as quickly as possible, discarding all non-essential equipment, knowing fully well that Indians will be coming after them fast. They marched whole night, taking cover in daylight to avoid any detection by locals or Indian posts. At third night, they were fatigued to the limit, there was

no food. Close to a population, they slaughtered a zho { native mountainous buffalo}ate the raw meat and gained strength. The one immediate result of eating raw meat was immense state of sleep and drowsiness . ‘I really had to stretch myself to the limit to be able to walk and to make others also walk, otherwise everyone was willing to sleep at the very site, such was our state.’ Remarked Brigadier Nasrallah years later. Later another successful raid was carried on at Shodok, a small outpost fifteen miles ahead of Kargil by Captain Nasrallah with 25 men.

Dras

The successful raid on Dras cantonment by SSG on 15/16th August 1965 was the most demoralising for the Indian Army deployed in the area. Captain Tariq Mahmood and Captain Tariq Rafi with thirty four commandos and six guides conducted the operations. The Dras cantonment had one engineer battalion, brigade headquarters and some supply elements. Cantonment itself is small, with a high barbed wire all around, a small landing strip inside the cantonment completes the scenery.

Brigadier Tariq Rafi recalls the operations ‘ *initial reconnaissance of Dras Cantonment was carried out off the map in early August, later Captain Tariq Mahmood attempted the first raid but , it not only failed , rather the raiding party was chased and fired upon by*

the Indians. Resultantly, it was decided by Lieutenant Colonel Afridi, to have two teams for the raid on Dras Cantonment. That is how myself and Captain Tariq Mahmood got together for the operations, we also decided in principle to employ the guides and porters only until base camp and not to take them along till the firing point. On 15 /16th August, we were in position, three miles short of the objective, we spent the night close to a lake, it was cold even in summer. Our guide was a civilian Ghulam Rasul., he was born in Dras and now had some genuine and imaginary grudges against the population, his motive was more of personal revenge than nationalism.. We both {groups } now moved further ahead and took up position a mere 800 meters away from cantonment , it was night 15/16th August. Main reason for our later success was this thorough reconnaissance which we both officers carried out. We finally selected three main targets, the engineer battalion, brigade headquarters and the transport shed. We also pondered over more targets as the whole cantonment was under our observation, we picked the officers mess and the residences also, aim was to kill as many Indian officers as possible. However later, we reached the conclusion that officers are not residing inside the Dras rather they have accommodation in nearby cantonment Muradabad.

We had 39 men in all, armed with six machine guns, three rocket launchers alongwith 36 rockets, one mortar with 18 rounds, each M-I rifle had 192 rounds of ammunition, three anti-tank mines, fifteen anti-personal mines and thirty eight hand grenades. We decided to initiate the raid at 0130 hours and after deciding upon the rendezvous we were hopeful to be back in our base camp by 1000 hours. Major Waheed was at the base camp.

We started our approach, ahead were three scouts which cleared the area, we passed through the nullah, and came into open ground, we had not seen this dead ground before, it was not visible from our position. Myself and Captain Tariq Mahmood had discussion, we both had our own views, I was firm that the target is on our right where as he thought and stressed that target is on left.. In pitch darkness we send two scouts to confirm the target direction but they came back after half an hour without any confirmation, we then ourselves walked out to ascertain the direction but still no conclusive results to confirm the direction of the Dras Cantonment. At dawn, we had to retreat back to our previous location, we decided to spent the day in nullah and make an attempt at night. When the mission with so much of planning fails at the end due to such small human mistake, therefore it is but natural that tempers will also shoot up. Myself and Captain Tariq had a hot

discussion, but in the end all troops had gone to sleep. Soon another blunder surfaced, the rocket launcher soldiers, in anticipation of the raid, had already taken out the rockets and threw away the packing material , now thirty six such cartons were lying around. Another unexpected twist was the accidental approach of three civilians who just walked next to us and saw us, we captured them and after some time they revealed that they are Muslims and resident of Khandial Village which is close by. We had no option but to trust them, they pointed out the exact location of 7th Madras Battalion's tents, these tents were not far off from where we halted last night.

At night we walked and guide took us to the near vicinity of the cantonment, but at the final phase, the exact location of target was still not confirm, thus contrary to all teaching, we had to awake a person from the village to show us the tents of the Indian troops. The man walked with us, and after fifty yards , simply pointed to the area ahead , these were Indian soldiers tents.

At 2217 hours, the first round was fired from a rocket launcher at a range of 250 yards, soon every weapon with us was firing on the target, one rocket hit the petroleum dump which lit the whole area. Every rifleman was supposed to save at least sixteen rounds for the return journey. Six minutes after the first round was

fire, I gave the signal for withdrawal much to the dismay of Captain Tariq Mahmood.

Our rendezvous was a clump of tree , now the cantonment was alive, and Indian posts located around the cantonment started firing indiscriminately, to our horror, even the fire came from rendezvous; we had committed another mistake, in not clearing the rendezvous beforehand. Indians made a cardinal mistake, they did not fire a vary light round, had they done so , we all would have been seen . Luck favours the brave, thus we were lucky to escape through safely despite these tactical blunders, by first light we reached our next rendezvous at lake. Next day we were in Skardu.

On 1st September 1965, Pakistan Army launched its Operation Grand Slam, which almost achieved the desired results, Akhnur was merely four miles away, India realising the precarious situation, launched an attack in the morning of 6th September 1965 across the international border without any warning.

Para-Drops on Indian Airfields - 1965

In January 1965, Air Chief Marshall Nur Khan brought forward the very idea of destroying the Indian Air Force aircraft on ground; by employing the commandos of SSG; it was a bold, innovate and daring

idea. The employment of airborne troops in WWII by the Germans and later by the allies had brought a new revolution in military affairs. The key factor in the stunning success of the German paratroopers was in the fact that they were under the command of Luftwaffe and were part of the air force. In Pakistan the paratrooping was introduced only in 1963 and the para training school was raised in March 1964.

The initial plan and requirement of the PAF involved destruction of the enemy airfields as deep as 250 miles away; later on after deliberation with SSG it was agreed to target only those airfields which are close to border thus Halwara, Pathankot, Ambala, Chandigarh and Adampur airfields were marked as the target. Later Ambala and Chandigarh were taken off the target list. This plan was finalised in May 1965; In June 1965 the plan was given final touches and Commander SSG Colonel Mehdi gave the briefing to the Air Marshall Nur Khan. The plan revolved around dropping sixty commandos on each of the three airfields, where the commandos would destroy the aircraft, and petroleum tanks and kill aircrew if chance arises. The plan focussed that if execution phase went as per the planning then the PAF aircraft can land on the same airfields and bring back home the commandos; on the other hand, the commandos can extricate themselves in case the own aircraft are unable to land and pick the commandos. This

was the most daring plan and highlights the spirits of the nation and the armed forces at that time. Like all military plans, it was accepted in the briefing and planning that the 'Fog of War' will be there , but rationally it offers the best chance to cripple the enemy in the opening hours of the war. Years and decades later the same scarlet thread of destroying the enemy airforce on ground has been implemented with varying success by armies around the world.

The Plan's Scarlet Thread was in the notion that Pakistan will have the advantage of initiating the war, thus the element of surprise will be with the attacker. However the changing face of events in August {Operation Gibraltar} and later Operation Grand Slam,; which almost achieved the desired end resulted in Indians launching the attack across the international border without any warning there by on the morning of 6th September 1965, initiative was with the enemy.

GHQ in a bold move, decided to go ahead with the plan and orders reached Cherat at 0930 hours to be ready for the execution phase. Ranger battalions at Cherat and Attock received the orders at 1000 hours . The Group Commander Colonel S.G. Mehdi himself was on short emergency leave thus the orders were received and passed by acting commander Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Mateen. *‘ I was called by the company commander at 1045 hours and told to get the men ready*

and be prepared to move at short notice to Peshawar, I later detailed Company Havildar Major to collect the men, I also detailed naib subedar to collect ammunition and explosives, at 1130 hours I distributed the ammunition and we loaded our equipment and ration in the heavy vehicles, we faced problem and delays in this as the number of heavy vehicles were limited, we left Attock at 1300 hours and reached Para Training School {PTS} in another hour. I gave the ration to PTS for cooking our evening meal and also to prepare our two days pack ration. At 1900 hours I was briefed by the company commander on our task. We thus rigged the equipment, due to shortage , we rigged two packs together, before getting into the C-130 aircraft , our company commander showed us the air photograph of the intended airfield, at 2345 hours we were inside the aircraft which took off at 0100 hours and we jumped out at 0230 hours’.

There were some inevitable delays, the companies which were initially earmarked for the para drops {Ebrahim and Kamal} were short of manpower due to troops proceeding on leave, this shortage was fulfilled from men of Ayub and Hamza companies. In ordinary circumstances this adjustment of men would have very little bearing on the operation but in this particular operation this was a cardinal factor on the overall outcome of operation. At Peshawar, the delay

was due to planning of the air raid by own aircraft over the Indian airfields, the three C-130s had to be provided with an escort and a complete local air supremacy for the safety of the paratroopers.

Pathankot , Halwara and Adampur all are situated in the first cardinal from Lahore. Pathankot is the closest to the border , a mere thirty miles. Followed by Halwara near Hoshiarpur, and then Adampur near Ludhiana; all these airfields are located in Indian Punjab. The three groups were; Pathankot team was led by Major Khalid Gulrez Butt , Captain Bunyad Hussain, Captain Muhammad Azad and 61 Rangers. Adampur airfield team was led by Captain S.A. Durrani, Captain Ghulam Kabir, Captain Muhammad Ashraf along with 55 Rangers. For Halwara Captain Hassan Iftikhar, Captain Ghulam Ahmad, Captain Hazoor Hasnain and 63 Rangers.

Pathankot

Naik Mohammad Sarwar, landed in between the railway line and road, Subedar{ PJO 37939} Fazal Shah of Kamal Company, jumped out from the C-130 at 0227 hours, after two minutes he landed in the middle of canal , *' I fell into the water, I swam and came out, wrapped my parachute, punctured and cut at random, to make it unserviceable, hid it under a bush and started searching my team mate. Soon I made*

contact with two, then four and finally we all were in touch with Major Butt and Captain Bunyad,; all in all we were 26 commandos. We tried to search for other paratroopers but in vain,. Due to paucity of time Major Butt decided to carryout the arid with the available men...we crossed a metallic road, and immediately came under fire, we took positions and manoeuvred, cross the canal bridge in the process and were moving in a straight file, when we realised that we are being followed. Havildar Abbas Ali, Lance Naik Muzzaffar and Sepoy Shah Nawaz thus laid an ambush for the enemy{ all three were martyred}, meanwhile rest of the body kept marching in darkness. Now the dawn broke out and we found ourselves in open fields. We threw our all extra luggage and equipment, less ammunition and explosives in the canal, Major Butt now divided the group into two parties and each was left to make its own arrangement, I was in Major Butt's team. We had decided to meet at a rendezvous after dark and to make another attempt to raid the Pathankot airfield.. We marched and established a hideout in the crops, we remained in the crops till evening, at around 1700 hours, our sentry warned us that almost two infantry companies of enemy have encircled us. Major Butt decided to fight till last. Indians were fired upon as soon as we heard the rustle of crop being disturbed, in return a machine gun volley was sprayed through the crops by the Indians along with mortar. We soon ran out of our ammunition,

finally after a deadly pause, enemy started searching us in the crop and a hand to hand fight erupted. At the end, our hands were tied and we were taken to Pathankot in trucks’.

Adampur

Havildar Malik SherBaz Khan was performing the duties of Ebrahim Company’s company havildar major {CHM}. He wrote ‘ *I landed north of the Adampur airfield, immediately I tucked my parachute and with the help of north star I started walking ...soon I encountered few paratroopers, thus we were four in total, soon I found Sepoy Ghulam Nabi, he had my rucksack, it took few minutes to change the rucksack, it was deadly error as we both lost track of our men and as such had to walk at our own...we both marched towards the Adampur airfield, short of airfield, we left our rucksack in fields and with only weapons and ammunition started stalking towards the airfield, we both could see the light of the airfield , which was burning due to recent attack by our aircraft on airfield. At 1000 yards short of airfield, all of a sudden the anti aircraft and ground weapons started firing, O assumed as if own commandos have initiated the arid on the airfield. It was now dawn 7th September 1965. We both remained hidden in the crops and waited for the outcome*

of the raid. I could hear on the village loudspeaker the announcement regarding our arrests and presences. For next whole week, we both marched in and around , hiding ourselves in the crops. On the night of 16/17th September, myself and Sepoy Nabi were on the outskirts of Jullundur City, we crossed a road, and the parallel railway line...an enemy patrol of ten men was walking , we both hid ourselves behind the tree, the enemy patrol was so close to us that we both could hear them talking, unfortunately, Sepoy Nabi coughed at that precise moment. The Indians opened fire on us, we returned the fire and made good of our escape. We stalked and passed through the outer limits of the railway station, a dog barked on us and we had to jump into a nullah to save our life. We finally took cover in a maize field.

It was 17th September now, the field in which we had taken cover, there was a water pitcher closeby, a Sikh working in the field would occasionally come and take a swig out of it. We change our position and due to tiredness and fatigue soon slept. All of a sudden I woke up , and a cursory reconnaissance confirmed my worst fear, we were encircled by the enemy, I assessed the situation, we had no ammunition left, thus as a last resort we just remained idle , hoping that providence will help us...we were arrested and blindfolded and taken to the police station’.

Halwara

Subedar Allah Ditta {PJO5980} of Ebrahim Company narrates , *‘After landing , we collected our parachutes and in darkness, got together, First Lance Naik Noor Muhammad met me, then Sepoy Bashir, we walked together, later seven more commandos joined us, we were now ten men. I tried to search for other but in vain. At 0330 hours, we walked towards the airfield , after a mile and half of march, we heard the aircraft noises and the machine gun fire. In this situation, soon the dawn emerged. We spent the day bin the maize field and at evening started walking again towards the target . At 1845 hours we were very close to the airfield, short of it we drank water from a well, our morale was high and we decided , not to go back empty handed. At 1930 hours, the airfield acme under heavy attack from own aircraft, at that time we were 400 yards short of the outer perimeter of the airfield. A bomb exploded very close to us, in this fog of war situation, we decided to retreat back to the crops, thinking that the airfield has been destroyed as per the initial planning. The rendezvous which was originally agreed upon was the canal bridge m thus we waited there for an hour but none acme to join us. We decided to trek back to Pakistan at our own and to link up with the commandos; thus the remaining part of night was spent in the fields adjacent to canal. Next day {8th September 1965} we*

remained inside the crops waiting for the darkness when at 1500 hours two civilians entered the crops and started reaping , they both dangerously reached close to me. All of a sudden they ran back , I knew that they have spotted us, thus we also change our position, we walk all night and on the morning of 9th September we were spotted by civilians busy in watering their fields. We now were running from field to field but soon we were encircled by the police and army , an announcement was being made on the loud speaker, all Pakistanis hiding in the field to come out without your weapons. We for some time responded back in fire but after ammunition had been expended, we came out of the field’.

The paradrop mission although it did not went as per planning but still it made its impact on the overall outcome of the war. The mere presence of paratroopers created a wave of terror among the Indian population and the army. The aircraft were taken away from the forward bases, an entire army division {14 Mountain} was stopped while proceeding towards the Samba – Sialkot axis, to hunt down the paratroopers; in the end the very division was mauled by the PAF while parked in hunt of paratroopers. A total of 182 paratroopers took part in the operation, 64 for Patahknkot, 55 for Adampur and 63 for Halwara airfields, five commandos embraced martyrdom, 13 were injured, 15 became missing in action

and 127 were captured, only 22 managed to reach back to Pakistan.

Another operation was planned on 16th September 1965 , Ambala airfield was the designated target, and Ghazi Company was the executor. At noon , on same day, a briefing was held at Para Training School at Peshawar, however the mission was cancelled in the hatching period. Indians did not launched any paradrop in Pakistan during 1965 War. But a rumour spread across the country and especially in the army field headquarters regarding the presence of Indian paratroopers in Kharian and Rawalpindi. Few infantry battalions were moved at night, patrolling was conducted around all army and air force bases ; in the end these just proved to be rumours, it highlights the kind of terror which the mere rumour of paratroops creates. Own operation against Indian airfields should be seen in the background of mental paralysis which they were able to sow in the minds of Indian military mind set.

SSG Companies in War

The companies which did not took part in the paradrop were employed on various missions, **Ghazi Company** after the mission for Ambala was cancelled ,

moved to Shakargarh area with Captains Tariq Mahmood, Tariq Rafi and Nasrallah in command. Ghazi Company was trusted with the disruption of Indian military convoys on the road Jammu –Kathua. On the night of 21/22 September, company moved to Chammb Jaurian undercommand Major Naeem, the mission was to get the information about the enemy disposition in the area. Later in first week of October, Ghazi Company was moved into Zafarwal area.

Ayub Company. The company during Operation Grand Slam was undercommand 15 Infantry Division, on 3rd September, it came under the operational command of 7 Infantry Division. The task was classical commando missions; create terror among the enemy, which the company did remarkably. Early on the morning of 6th September, company commander Major Sarwar embraced shahadat, while Captain Muhammad Inayat was wounded. On 7th September, while carrying out an commando raid on enemy gun position in Jaurian sector, Captain Muhammad Sadiq and Sepoy Muhammad Riaz not only accomplished the mission , Captain Sadiq later succumbed to the bullet wounds sustained during operation and embraced shahadat. Major Shamim Alam Khan took over the command of the company, it was later placed undercommand 1 Corps. From the night of 8th September the company was tasked to detect and exterminate the Indian commandos

who were rumoured to be present between Daska-Sialkot area. As the rumours turned out to be mere rumours, the Ayub Company and Ghazi Company were employed together on destruction of Indian troops moving on Kathua-Samba- Jammu road. Few targets were engaged, one medium gun was destroyed on the night of 12/13 September, and in another raid an Indian tank was disabled. An Indian post near Ramgarh was attacked while coming back from a patrol, In the dying hours of the war, an opportunity target in the form of a retreating Indian infantry company was ambushed with great success.

Shaheen Company, at the onset of war was already deployed in Neelum Valley, later the 12 Division employed the company in the defence of an outpost. The post itself came under enemy attack, the post was defended, in the accomplishment of mission two soldiers embraced martyrdom.

Jangju Company was undercommand 15 Infantry Division, they were task at the very first night of the war 6/7th September to carryout raid and ambushes on the road Kathua – Samba. The ambush was a success, one major reason of the success was the induction of the Punjab Rangers {Sutlej Wing}. An inspector and 25 soldiers of Sutlej Rangers accompanied the commandos. The knowledge of area was and is still critical for the success of any commando raid. SSG had been carrying out regular and periodic

reconnaissance of the border areas, still the knowledge which the Punjab Rangers had accumulated by virtue of seven years of stay at one particular place cannot be matched. In the end, two enemy trucks and one jeep was destroyed.

Tipu Company . After the ceasefire, a minor war erupted in the desert between Pakistan and India, in which the Indians tried to recapture the lost posts in the desert. A Desert Force was thus raised with rangers of Desert Rangers. Tipu Company arrived undercommand Major Fazal Akbar in Rahim Yar Khan on 4th November 1965; their two main task were to train the mujahedeen and to carryout raids on enemy lines of communication. Tipu Company was thus grouped into three teams, each led by Major Fazal, Captain Waheed Arshad Gujial and Captain Inayat. The very first mission was to ambush an enemy convoy, thus on the night of 17th November at 2100 hours, a twenty commandos team led by company commander moved out of Kishengarh and establish a position almost twenty miles further east. At 0400 hours the reported convoy came and was successfully ambushed, destroying an enemy truck along with a jeep; two Indian soldiers were taken as prisoners as well. Another successful ambush was carried out by Captain Waheed on the night of 29th November , the target was the command echelon of an 3rd Indian Grenadier {an infantry battalion}. Ambush was carried out in broad

daylight as enemy had almost abandoned the travelling after dark due to fear of own commandos. At Achari Toba, local guides were taken , so were a section of Desert Rangers. Ambush site was between the Tanot-Sadewala posts within enemy territory. At 0930 hours the prey entered the killing zone, after few minutes of firing, the three occupant of the jeep, Major Poran Singh, one captain and two soldiers were killed and own commando force extricated safely.

The success of these mission owe much to the local para military organisation notably the Punjab Rangers. SSG had not trained on the camel riding and handling, as it had concentrated more on mountainous warfare thus Desert Rangers expertise in desert came very handy.

In East Pakistan, where **Quaid Company** was undercommand 23 Brigade ex 14 Infantry Division. There was not much of action on the Eastern front. On 22nd September 1965, in the lone mission of war, the Quaid Company carried out an ambush on an Indian defensive position with success.

In the 1965 War, SSG lost three officers, one junior commissioned officer and 26 soldiers. It was decorated with ten Sitara-i-Jurat, twelve Tamgha -i-Jurat, one Sitara-i-Basalt , two Tamgha-i-Basalt and 23 Imtiazi Sanads.

